China’s population control policies, while limiting growth and curbing family-style development, have disrupted traditional social structures, suppressed the expansion of family-owned businesses and political dynasty power, presenting a unique case compared to South Korean conglomerates and Indian family monopolies. Now that birth restrictions are being relaxed, despite facing challenges such as low fertility rates, it’s crucial to be wary of new monopoly risks and seek balance through multiple avenues.
One: The Disjunction Between Population Control and Family-Style Development
The family planning policy, which has been a fundamental national strategy in China for nearly forty years, has achieved significant direct results. Data shows that from 1978 to 2007, the natural growth rate of China’s population declined from 12‰ to 5.2‰, resulting in a reduction of over 40 million people, and the proportion of the Chinese population worldwide decreased from 22.2% to 20.1%. This sharp decline in population growth profoundly reshaped family structures within Chinese society. Taking family-owned enterprises as an example, after the implementation of the family planning policy, the number of children born by business owners declined significantly: before the policy, the proportion of those having three or more children reached 40.63%, and after the policy it plummeted to 18.46%, the proportion of single sons born increased from 6.25% to 32.31%. This structural change directly reduced the range of potential internal successors for family-owned enterprises, objectively suppressing their generational expansion capabilities.
In contrast to Korea and India, the differences are significant. Although Korea did not implement strict family planning policies, its birth rate has remained low (0.7 in 2023), however, its chaebols have maintained control over the national economy through cross-shareholdings and tax avoidance mechanisms. The total revenue of the top five chaebols accounts for more than 50% of Korea’s GDP, with Samsung Group alone accounting for 20% of the country’s GDP. India, on the other hand, presents a different picture: 79% of economic output is contributed by family-owned enterprises, and six major conglomerates control key sectors such as telecommunications and steel, with twenty top companies earning 80% of national corporate profits. The core of this difference lies in the fact that China’s family planning policy, through limiting family size, has weakened the human resources base for family-owned enterprise expansion from the source, while Korea and India have been able to sustain their influence in economic sectors due to different policy environments.
Two. Monopoly Restraint and Social Structural Transformation
The impact of the family planning policy on the economic sector is particularly evident in its suppression of monopoly phenomena. Due to the reduced number of children within Chinese family businesses, the formation of Han-Indian style conglomerates like those led by chaebols was difficult. Taking Korea as an example, chaebols maintained control through “circular investment,” with the Samsung family holding only 2% of the group’s shares but controlling the entire operation through complex equity structures. In China, after the family planning policy, family businesses generally faced the dilemma of “passing down from father to son,” often necessitating the introduction of professional managers or implementing equity diversification reforms. According to a湃新闻 (Papare News) study, the proportion of female successors in family businesses after family planning increased from 13.85% to 34.21%, and the education level of these successors significantly improved, with the percentage of college graduates rising from 43.75% to 98.46%. While this transformation has not completely eliminated family control, it has significantly reduced the possibility of a single family monopolizing the market.
On the social structural level, the family planning policy accelerated the disintegration of traditional family core models. The average household size in China decreased from 4.41 people/household in 1982 to 2.62 people/household in 2020, weakening the family’s functions in areas such as economics, education, and social support. In contrast, India maintains a family size of around 4 people, with the caste system deeply intertwined with family power, leading to low social mobility. China’s transformation of household structure created space for individualism, with the number of single adult citizens reaching 240 million in 2023, and a trend of “one-person economy” emerging in the consumer market – further diminishing the influence of family economies.
Three. Decentralization of Power in the Political Sphere
The impact of the family planning policy on the political landscape has been profound. Traditionally, family power structures had infiltrated grassroots politics through bloodlines and kinship relationships. For example, the 161 political families in Henan’s Xinye County virtually controlled all government departments, with 20% of cadres at deputy-level or above belonging to “officer’s children.” However, after the implementation of the family planning policy, shrinking family sizes limited the expansion of family networks. Research from Peking University showed that the number of offspring of officials decreased after family planning, and the complexity of family political networks significantly declined. Furthermore, the policy-driven promotion of education (the average years of schooling increased from 5.2 in 1982 to 10.9 in 2023) facilitated social mobility, weakening the monopoly of family power over political resources.
In comparison with South Korea and India, the deep entanglement between Korean conglomerates and politics (such as Samsung Group executives engaging in bribery with government officials) and the hereditary family politics under the Indian caste system highlighted the uniqueness of China’s policy. China objectively reduced the possibility of power succession through the family planning policy. Despite the presence of family phenomena in county-level politics, the overall trend is towards the decentralization of the power structure. During the 2025 National People’s Congress meeting, a CPPCC member proposed renaming “The Law on Population and Family Planning” to “The Law on Population and Reproduction,” fully opening up childbirth – a move that may further influence the future evolution of the political landscape.
Four, Challenges and Opportunities Following Policy Adjustments
The implementation of the 2016 comprehensive two-child policy and the 2021 three-child policy marked a significant shift in China’s birth policies. However, the effects were limited: In 2022, the birth rate was only 1.18, far below the replacement level (2.1). The relaxation of birth restrictions had a dual impact on family-owned enterprises: On one hand, some entrepreneurs may strengthen their family succession capabilities through multiple births, such as Zong Qinghui, the daughter of Zhong Quehui of Wahaha Group in Zhejiang, who took over as the sole heir; on the other hand, high childcare costs (the average cost of raising a child to 18 years old in first-tier cities reaches 10 million yuan) and declining fertility intentions among professional women limited the expansion of family size.
In the economic sphere, relaxing birth restrictions may give rise to new monopoly forms. The three-child policy has accelerated the concentration of the maternal and childcare industry, with the market size of infant and toddler care expected to reach 1621.3 billion yuan in 2025. Leading companies have consolidated smaller manufacturers through mergers and acquisitions, resulting in a CR5 market concentration exceeding 55%. This increase in concentration may bring efficiency, but it also needs to be wary of new monopoly risks. The government must seek a balance between encouraging births and preventing market concentration, such as strengthening regulation through antitrust laws while providing childcare subsidies (such as Hangzhou’s three-child families receiving a monthly milk powder subsidy of 3000 yuan) to reduce family burdens.
In the political sphere, relaxing birth restrictions may have subtle impacts on family power structures. Although it is unlikely to restore traditional family political networks in the short term, from a long-term perspective, multi-child families may form new influence in grassroots politics. Therefore, improving personnel selection mechanisms and strengthening supervision (such as establishing a cadre relative appointment avoidance system) are still crucial for preventing hereditary power.
Five. International Mirroring and Future Outlook
The experiences of South Korea and India demonstrate that the ebb and flow of family power is closely linked to policy orientations. South Korea achieved economic takeoff by supporting conglomerates, but at the cost of social inequality; India’s failure to implement effective policies to curb family monopolies has exacerbated wealth disparity. China’s population control policy effectively suppressed the expansion of family powers while simultaneously creating problems such as an aging population and labor shortages.
Looking ahead, China needs to find a new balance between population policy and socio-economic development. On one hand, it should increase birth rates through fertility support policies (such as extending maternity leave and building accessible childcare institutions); on the other hand, it must strengthen antitrust enforcement to prevent family businesses from forming new monopolies through capital operations. In the political sphere, further progress is needed in grassroots democracy construction, strengthening oversight mechanisms, and ensuring transparency in governance.
In conclusion, population control policies were a key driver of social change in China, with impacts far exceeding the realm of population. They reshaped family structures, economic models, and the political landscape, providing a path for China to avoid falling into the trap of family monopolies seen in Korea and India. As policies are adjusted, balancing efficiency and equity, freedom and order within the new demographic context will be a long-term challenge facing China.