Xiaomi’s current downturn cannot be attributed solely to an “AI spending spree” narrative. Over the past year, the stock price fell steadily from a high of around HKD 60 in July 2025 to HKD 25.84 on June 11, 2026. What is truly difficult is the convergence of three factors: smartphone profits are squeezed by rising storage costs; the auto sector has moved from rapid volume growth to a stage of subsidy tapering and model switching; and AI investments have pushed the market’s patience for free cash flow further into the future.

Looking back at this on Beijing Time June 9, 2026—the line from June 5 is no longer sufficient. On June 8, the A-share market failed to digest last Friday’s retracement of tech stocks; instead, the ChiNext board, STAR 50, CPO, and semiconductors continued to decline sharply. Simultaneously, US stocks also saw intraday pullbacks on June 8, with QQQ, SOXX, and a group of AI chip stocks exhibiting obvious rebounds. When looking at both markets together, the conclusion is even less straightforward: A-shares are continuing to dismantle crowded trades, while US stocks are performing high-elasticity rallies intraday. Neither of these events serves as concrete evidence that “clearing has been completed.”

After observing the capital movements of large model companies these past few days, it’s easy to confuse two issues.

Zhipu and MiniMax are both pursuing the A-share listing path. Anthropic has already made a confidential filing of draft S-1 to the SEC, and OpenAI was also reported by Axios to be preparing a confidential IPO prospectus. Having these pieces of news lined up suggests that this industry has finally reached its peak/harvesting period.

But merely opening up an IPO window does not mean that the profitable window is open. Large model companies do have revenue—some revenue streams are growing very fast. What has not generally turned around yet is the set of accounts related to net profit, operating cash flow, and sustained model investment.

/goal is easily misinterpreted as a command to “let the agent work for a bit longer.”

This, of course, is merely its surface manifestation. If you give Codex a goal, it can continuously progress around that objective, instead of stopping after a single round of answers. But what is truly noteworthy is not how long it “runs,” but rather that it converts “what constitutes completion” from a temporary reminder into an intrinsic part of the task itself.

A standard prompt describes what needs to happen next. A goal, however, is more like attaching a checklist/acceptance form to an agent: What is the objective? Where are the boundaries? Which validations must pass? What conditions must be met for it to be considered complete?

When the A-share semiconductor and AI hardware chains surge rapidly, two extreme reactions tend to emerge: one type of person feels that missing out on gains (FOMO) is more painful than actually incurring losses, while another believes that excessive rises necessarily signal a bubble.

Both of these are too fast. In areas like semiconductors, computing power, optical modules, and storage, the industrial logic might be true. AI training and inference will indeed boost hardware demand, and domestic substitution has certainly provided narrative space and order opportunities for local companies. The problem is that just because the industrial logic holds true does not mean that the probability of investing in it now is good.

Similar market trends have occurred repeatedly in history: the liquor sector (Baijiu), new energy, pharmaceuticals, core asset grouping, and TMT. Each time, there was real logic behind it. When these sectors decline, it doesn’t necessarily mean the logic has disappeared; rather, the timing/rhythm between valuation, positioning, earnings realization, and liquidity was off.

For a platform, what is most damaging from regulatory crackdowns on illegal cross-border activities is not the stock price for one or two days, but the potential reassessment of its entire historical growth model. Fines are one account; whether the retained domestic customer base can continue to contribute transactions, financing, assets, and conversions is another, much longer-term concern.

The greatest strength of internet brokers like Futu and Tiger is their ability to make Hong Kong and US stock trading a low-friction product. The problem is that when this experience faces mainland users, it encounters barriers related to licensing, foreign exchange regulations, suitability assessment for investors, data handling, and the boundaries of cross-border financial services.

Therefore, the third section should focus only on the business model and institutional stratification. Although the product capability of cross-border securities firms remains strong, if regulatory boundaries re-enclose the largest and most readily available user base, its valuation can no longer be predicated on old growth stories.

After regulatory news breaks, what ordinary users are most concerned about is not the brokerage firm’s stock price, but whether they can still operate their own accounts: whether they can buy, sell, withdraw funds, or transfer positions. The phrase that is easiest to misunderstand here is “the two-year focused cleanup period.”

If only new account openings are restricted, the perceived experience of existing users will not change immediately. However, if current transactions are further restricted, users will encounter entirely different issues. The mildest approach might be a sell-only mandate; the most restrictive could require fund transfers, capital withdrawals, or the revocation of certain trading permissions.

This piece only discusses the user side. What truly needs preparation is not speculating whether regulations will loosen, but rather separating and analyzing “the length of historical buffers granted” from “what these public statements currently require.”

Investigations into Hong Kong and US stockbrokers caused initial price drops, with account issues only truly pressing upon users later. The most critical change this time is not the issuance of another regulatory statement, but rather the boundary shifting from “don’t allow new entrants” to focusing on “how existing players should exit.”

During the last inspection, many understood that domestic users could no longer arbitrarily open new accounts, but those who already had accounts could continue trading. This boundary provided both the platform and the users with a buffer zone, making the existing accounts appear as a gray but maintainable historical burden.

This set of articles should be split into three parts: The first article will only focus on regulatory boundaries, the second will cover how accounts can be operated/affected, and the third will discuss how platforms and other brokerage firms should re-price. We must clarify the boundaries first; otherwise, we risk mixing user operations, company valuations, and industry rectification all together.