After Zhipu and MiniMax were included in the Hang Seng Tech Index, the most common question that arises is: Since they have not yet reached their first lock-up period, are index funds compelled to buy shares?

This question cannot be answered directly based on emotion.

Inclusion in the index must first adhere to publicly disclosed methodologies. Delisting will affect future supply and stock price pressure, but it is not a hard threshold within the Hang Seng Tech Index methodology. Passive funds buy before and after the index takes effect because their goal is to track the index, not because the index company is arranging exits for existing shareholders.

When many people first see US Treasuries, the easiest thing to do is misread a number.

When you see 4.5% advertised in the market, it’s easy to mentally fill in a simple phrase: “If I invest now, I will reliably earn 4.5% every year and continue receiving it until maturity.”

This statement is only half right.

4.5% often aligns more closely with an “annualized yield metric,” and does not mean that you receive cash of 4.5% every year. What actually reaches your account is the result calculated from three factors combined: coupon payments, the purchase price, and principal repayment at maturity.

Bottom line first.

As of May 20, 2026, the strength of A-shares and the weakness of Hang Seng Tech are not due to one asset pool having lagging components; rather, it is a divergence between two sets of pricing logics. On May 20, 2026, the Shanghai Composite Index closed at 4162.19 points, still fluctuating near 4200; meanwhile, on its most recently available closing date of May 19, 2026, the Hang Seng Tech Index closed at 4857.46 points, which is still short of the phase historical high point of 10945.22 recorded on February 17, 2021, by 55.6%.

If your statement that the “CSI 300 ETF has matched its historical peak” refers to the most common 510300, the closing price I captured on 2026-05-20 was 4.871. This still represents about a 16.1% drawdown from the 5.807 recorded on 2021-02-10, and has not reached an all-time high. It is highly likely that various calculation bases were mixed here: Price, Net Asset Value (NAV), Adjusted NAV, Total Return Index. They look like they are the same thing, but they actually are not.

Allow me to correct a name. The “China Golden Dragon Fish Index” you mentioned usually refers to the Nasdaq Gold Dragon China Index, whose English name is Nasdaq Golden Dragon China Index, not “Golden Dragon Fish.”

Let’s first establish the date. ChatGPT’s public research preview version was released on November 30, 2022, not 2023. [1]

After this point, NVIDIA’s data center GPU main roadmap is quite clear: The conclusion of Ampere, followed by Hopper taking over. Hopper focused on expanding VRAM capacity and refresh rate, while Blackwell will shift its focus from “single-card dense compute power” toward “inference throughput, power consumption, and system-level interconnection.” The China-specific versions represent a different story: A800, H800, and H20 are fundamentally compliance versions created under US export control constraints, and therefore cannot be viewed using the same metrics as the global flagship line.

This meeting is neither about the sudden “thaw” of Sino-US relations, nor is it about one side completely overpowering the other. Rather, it appears to be a mandatory recalibration conducted under heightened pressure.

If you only look at the surface, you see welcome ceremonies, state banquets, the Temple of Heaven, and corporate delegations—it is very spectacular. But if you lay out the timeline, what this meeting truly needs to address are four tougher matters: how to maintain the trade and economic ceasefire left over from the Busan talks last October; how to manage the risks concerning Taiwan; how to mitigate losses stemming from the spillovers of the Iran conflict; and whether, under their respective domestic political pressures, both sides can first stabilize relations and avoid continued decline.

In other words, this Beijing meeting first and foremost aimed at “preventing a loss of control,” with “making deals” being secondary.

In the previous article The end point of this semiconductor cycle is probably not in 2026, I presented my conclusion first, but deliberately did not dive too deep into the specific details of the financial reports.

What we are covering this time is the part that is most easily obscured by market sentiment: When semiconductors rise, everyone knows they are profitable; but what truly determines whether a cycle can be extended or which company can capitalize on high growth more thoroughly is often not the stock price, but rather the profit and loss statement, capital expenditure, and product investment direction during the trough.

If I must make a more specific judgment, as of May 13, 2026, I still do not pinpoint 2026 as the end of this upcycle. However, if I have to pick just one major player among the giants that is most worth watching, it would be SK hynix. Not because it hasn’t gone through a downturn—quite the opposite—but because it made the most representative strategic choices when things looked their worst in 2023.

My previous article covered the semiconductor cycle, and I feel like there’s a piece of background/context missing.

Your judgment/conclusion regarding this point—the overall direction is correct. Furthermore, I believe it is a prerequisite that is easiest to overlook when trying to understand this current semiconductor boom.

A more accurate way to put it is not that “all internet giants are fighting in the same field,” but rather: Large Models have, for the first time, brought together major players previously scattered across different domains—such as search, advertising, social media, e-commerce, office productivity, cloud computing, and content distribution—into direct competition within the same technical stack.

This technology stack includes models, computational power, inference, cloud, Agents, distribution gateways, and commercialization closed loops. Everyone’s original “moat” is different, but now we must all fill the same gap. Those who fail to do so will see their future search entry points, ad pricing, office suites, e-commerce conversion, and social traffic distribution rewritten by others.

Regarding this round of semiconductor trends, I temporarily do not see a peak in 2026.

If forced to give an initial judgment, as of May 12, 2026, I am more inclined to place the truly critical period between the second half of 2027 and the first half of 2028, rather than now. The core driver of this current uptrend—particularly in US listed storage and Korean semiconductors—is not a general recovery, but rather AI pulling HBM, DDR5, and enterprise SSD up simultaneously. If supply expansion fails, both prices and profits will rise together.

This also explains why companies like Micron, SK hynix, and Samsung seem to be “printing money” lately. The semiconductor cycle hasn’t vanished, but this time it is unlikely to collapse when demand first kicks in; rather, it is more likely to crash when capacity expansion finally catches up, and the market has already front-loaded two or three years’ worth of profit.